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THE ANTICYBERSQ UATTING
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS FROM
THE COURTS OF APPEALS
SUE ANN MOTAt

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act' ("ACPA") to protect American consumers and businesses, to
promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in trademark law by prohibiting "cybersquatting," or the deliberate, bad faith,
and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names
with the intent to profit from the marks' goodwill. 2 The ACPA creates a
civil remedy for registering a domain name with a bad faith intent to
profit that is identical to or "confusingly similar" to a distinctive or fa3
mous mark.
This article will examine the ACPA as interpreted by published decisions from the First,4 Second, 5 Third, 6 Fourth, 7 Sixth s and Ninth 9 Cirt Professor Sue Ann Mota has been a faculty member in the Department of Legal
Studies at Bowling Green State University since 1984. She teaches Ethics and the Law in
Business in BGSU's MBA programs and teaches Computer Law at the undergraduate and
graduate levels. She has published over thirty articles, focusing her research on technology
and computer law as well as intellectual property issues. She is a graduate of the University of Toledo College of Law, cum laude, Order of the Coif, and a member and business
editor of the Law Review. She received her undergraduate and masters degrees in economics from BGSU.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d) (2002); see generally, John M. Cone, Cyberpiracy - The U.S.
Legislative Response, 6 Comp. L. Rev. & Tech. J. 221 (Spring 2002); Jason Kaplan, The
Anticybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct: Will it End the Reign of the Cybersquatter?,8
UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 43 (Fall 2000); Elizabeth Rebison Martin, "Too Famous To Live Long!"
The Anticybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct Sets Its Sights To Eliminate Cybersquatter Opportunistic Claims On Domain Names, 31 St. Mary's L.J. 797 (2000); Marc Lorelli,
How Trademark Litigation Over Internet Domain Names Will Change After Section 43 (d)
Of The Lanham Act, 78 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 97 (Fall 2000).
2. Sen. Rpt. No. 106-1410 (1999).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d) (2002).
4. See generally Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57
(1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4484, see infra nn. 28-33 and accompanying
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cuit Courts of Appeals. An analysis of these cases will follow.
II.

THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Finding that cybersquatting results in consumer fraud and public
confusion, impairs e-commerce, deprives legitimate trademark owners of
revenues and goodwill, and places burdens on trademark owners,10 Congress passed the ACPA" in 1999. Prior to the ACPA, there was no clear
deterrent to cybersquatting. 1 2 While the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act was used successfully against cybersquatters, 13 Congress believed
14
that specific legislation was necessary.
Thus, in November 1999, the ACPA became law, making it illegal to
register, traffic in, or use a domain name of another if the domain name
is a famous or distinctive mark or confusingly similar to a famous or
distinctive mark, with bad faith intent to profit.' 5 The statute gives nine
factors to examine in determining bad faith intent. 16 An injunction,
damages and transfer, forfeiture, or cancellation of the domain name are
available. 17 The plaintiff may elect statutory damages of $1,000$100,000.18 If the trademark owner cannot obtain personal jurisdiction
text; Sollen v. CorinthiansLicenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001); see infra nn.
34-37 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert denied, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4367; see infra nn. 17-26 and accompanying text.
6. See generally Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F. 3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001); see infra nn. 38-42
and accompanying text.
7. See generally HarrodsLtd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 217 (4th Cir.
2002); see infra nn. 61-68 and accompanying text; Porsche Cars N. Am. v. Porschenet, 302
F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002); see infra nn. 56-60 and accompanying text; People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); see infra nn. 50-55 and
accompanying text; Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir.
2001); see infra nn. 43-50 and accompanying text.
8. See generallyBird v. Parsons, 289 F. 3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002); see infra nn. 69-74 and
accompanying text.
9. See generally Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., No. 01-35155, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19632 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2002); see infra nn. 75-85 and accompanying text.
10. Sen. Rpt. 106-1410 (1999).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d) (2002).
12. Sen. Rpt. 106-1410, at 6 (1999).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (Supp. 1996); see e.g. PanavisionIntl. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Il. 1996). The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, however, requires marks to be famous and the Ninth Circuit has disallowed protection for marks not deemed famous. Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875-877 (9th Cir. 1999).
14. Serf. Rpt. 106-1410, at 7 (1999).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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over the defendant, or if, through due diligence, is not able to find the
defendant, an in rem action is available in the district where the domain
name registry is located. 19
A limited exemption from liability is granted to domain name registrars that suspend, cancel, or transfer domain names pursuant to a court
order or in the implementation of a reasonable policy prohibiting
20
cybersquatting.
III.

DECISIONS ON THE ACPA IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

At the time of this writing there have been ten published decisions
from the courts of appeals on the ACPA. In February 2000, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit became the first appellate court to apply
and interpret the ACPA in Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market,
Inc.2 1 Sportsman's began using the logo "sporty" in the 1960s and registered "Sporty's" as a trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office in 1985.22 Omega registered the domain name "Sportys.com;"
Omega's co-owner was aware of the "Sporty's" trademark. 23 Omega sold
24
the domain name to a wholly-owned subsidiary, Sporty's Farm.
Sportsman's discussed the registration of Sportys.com in 1996, and
Sporty's Farm sued to continue using Sportys.com. 2 5 Sportsman's counterclaimed for trademark infringement and trademark dilution under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"). 26 The district court held
injunction forcing
that Sporty's Farm violated the FTDA and issued an 27
Sporty's Farm to relinquish all rights to Sportys.com.
While the appeal was pending the ACPA was enacted; the court of
appeals applied the ACPA, ruling that the law to be applied is the law
that exists at the time of appeal. 28 Applying the ACPA, the court had to
determine first if "Sporty's" is a distinctive or famous mark. The court
held that it is both. 29 The court then had to decide if the domain name
"Sportys.com" is identical or confusingly similar to the "Sporty's" mark.
19. Id. "Domain name" is given the narrow definition of any alphanumeric designation
which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registry. It includes second-level
domain names (e.g. ".com", ".net") but could also include third and fourth level domains, if
assigned. Sen. Rpt. 106-1410, at 8 (1999).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d).
21. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 489.

22. Id. at 494.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494; see Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 875-77.

27. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495. Both parties appealed. Id.
28. Id. at 496. Sporty Farm's contends that this is impermissibly retroactive. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found this position to be meritless." Id. at 502.
29. Id. at 497.
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The court held that it is confusingly similar. 30 The court then had to
determine if a bad faith intent to profit was present. The court held that
there was "more than enough evidence on the record below of 'bad faith
intent to profit.'" 3 1 Thus Sporty's Farm violated the ACPA,3 2 and the
injunction granted by the district court was proper. 3 3 Thus, the first appellate decision upheld an injunction against the company registering
another's trademark as a domain name.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided two cases under
the ACPA in 2001. 34 In the first, Northern Light Technology, Inc. v.
Northern Lights Club, the appellate court affirmed a preliminary injunction under the ACPA. 35 North Light Technology, Inc. registered the
"Northern Light" service mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and registered the "northernlight.com" domain name in 1996.36 One
month after northernlight.com was registered, a self-described "Internet
entrepreneur," defendant Burgar, registered "northernlights.com." 3 7 In
1999, this issue came to light when a USA Today article erroneously
identified the plaintiffs Web site as northernlights.com. 38 The plaintiff
sent Mr. Burgar a cease-and-desist letter; Mr. Burgar did not reply. 39 A
lawsuit was filed, and was amended to add a claim under the ACPA after
its enactment. 40 A temporary restraining order was issued, which became a preliminary injunction, as the district court found that the plaintiff would probably succeed on the merits. 4 1 On appeal, the court found
no error in the district court's finding that the defendants will likely be
30. Id. This "confusingly similar" standard differs from the "likelihood of confusion"
standard used in trademark infringement cases. Id. at 498, n. 11.
31. Id. at 498.
32. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499.
33. Id. at 501. Damages, however, were not available to Sportsman's. Id.; see generally P. Wayne Hale, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act & Sporty's Farm
L.L.C. v. Sportyman's Market, Inc., 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 205 (2001); Alanna C. Rutherford, Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market: A Case Study in Internet Regulation Gone
Awry, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 421 (2000).
34. See generally Northern Light Technology, 236 F.3d 57; Sallen, 273 F.3d at 14.
35. Northern Light Technology, 236 F.3d at 66.
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id. at 59. Mr. Burgar has registered thousands of domain names similar or identical to popular people and organizations. Id. The Northern Lights Club, according to Mr.
Burgar, has no actual individual members. Id. The plaintiff, however, did not allege that
Mr. Burgar had actual knowledge of the northernlight.com registration. Id. at 59, n. 3.
38. Id. at 59.
39. Id. The plaintiff also requested that the domain name registry take away the domain name from Mr. Burgar, but this request was denied due to the one-letter discrepancy.
Id.
40. Northern Light Technology, 236 F.3d at 59-60.
41. Id. at 61.
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43
42
Thus the injunction was upheld.
found to have acted in bad faith.
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed for the
first time the issue of whether a domain name registrant who has lost an
arbitration at the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") in
Geneva, may bring an action in U.S. federal court to override this under
the ACPA.4 4 The appellate court said yes in Sallen v. Corinthians
Licenciamentos LTDA, reversing the district court.4 5 In 1998, Sallen
registered the "corinthians.com" domain name. 46 In 2000, the defendant, a Brazilian corporation that has rights in Brazil to the name
"Corinthiao," the Portuguese equivalent of Corinthians, a popular Brazilian soccer team, filed a complaint and prevailed at the WIPO. 4 7 Before
the domain name was transferred by the WIPO, Sallen filed this action
in a U.S. federal district court, which dismissed the case. 48 The appellate court, however, reversed and remanded, holding that a federal
court's interpretation of the ACPA supplants a WIPO interpretation of
domain disputes, which applies "the lowest common denominator of internationally agreed and accepted principles of the abuse of
4 9
trademarks."
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Shields v. Zuccarini upheld the district court's judgment and the award of statutory
damages and attorneys' fees. 50 Shields marketed cartoons under the
"Joe Cartoon" label for fifteen years before this suit. 5 1 In 1997 he registered "joecartoon.com." 5 2 In 1999 Zuccarini, a "wholesaler" of Internet
domain names, registered five domain names that were variations on
Shields' site. 53 Shields sent cease-and-desist letters to Zuccarini who did
not respond. This suit was filed under the ACPA and other claims and

42. Id. at 65. The defendants contested this, as well as the retroactive application of
the ACPA. Id. The appellate court "expressly eschew[ed] resolving the ACPA issue, because it failed to affect the validity of the injunction. Id. at 65-66.
43. Id. See Jian Xiao, Intellectual Property: The First Wave of Cases under the ACPA,
17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 159, 169 (2002).
44. Sallen, 273 F.3d at 16.
45. Id. at 29-30.
46. Id. at 20.
47. Id. at 21.
48. Sallen v. CorinthiansLicenciamentos, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19976 at *1 (D. Mass.
Dec. 19, 2000).
49. Sallen, 273 F.3d at 28; see generally Aaron L. Melville, New CybersquattingLaw
Brings Mixed Reactions from Trademark Owners, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 13 (2000).
50. Shields, 254 F.3d at 488.
51. Id. at 480.
52. Id. at 479-480.
53. Id. A "wholesaler" acquires multiple domain names with intent to profit from
them. Id. at n. 1. These sites registered by Zuccarini featured advertisements in which
visitors were "mousetrapped," meaning that they could not escape without clicking on the
ads. Zuccarini received revenue from the advertisers for every click. Id. at 480.
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Zuccarini changed these sites to political protest pages. 54 The district
court issued a preliminary injunction to Shields, ordering Zuccarini to
transfer the infringing domain names. The district court granted summary judgment to Shields, holding that Zuccarini registered the domain
55
names in violation of the ACPA.
On appeal, the court held that Shields was required to prove that
"Joe Cartoon" was a distinctive or famous mark, that Zuccarini's five domain names were identical or confusingly similar to Shield's mark, and
that Zuccarini registered the domain names with the bad faith intent to
profit from them.5 6 The district court did not err in its findings, thus the
57
judgment was affirmed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has issued four published opinions on the ACPA. In the first, Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the court affirmed in 2001 a district court's
decision ordering Virtual Works to relinquish the domain name "vw.net"
to Volkswagen. 58 Virtual Works registered the domain name "vw.net";
two of its principals were aware that some consumers might be confused,
and the principals discussed a plan to sell the domain name to the highest bidder. 59 Various Volkswagen dealers contacted Virtual Works expressing an interest in purchasing the domain name. 60 One of Virtual
Work's principals then left a voice mail message in Volkswagen's trademark office stating if Volkswagen did not purchase the domain name
within twenty-four hours, it would be sold to the highest bidder. 6 1 Volkswagen invoked the domain name registrar's dispute resolution policy. 6 2
Virtual Works filed declaratory judgment; Volkswagen counterclaimed
on several issues including the ACPA. 6 3 The district court ordered Vir54. Id.
55. Shields, 254 F.3d at 481. Zuccarini did not even respond to Shields' renewed motion for summary judgment. Id.
56. Id. at 482 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1125 (d) (1) (A), Sporty's Farm, 202 F. 3d at 497-99).
On appeal, Zucarrini argued that he was only "typosquatting", which is not actionable. Id.
The appellate court disagreed, stating that this was the classic example of a specific practice the ACPA was designed to prohibit. Id. at 483-84. For more on the issue of cybersquatting being defined as acquiring the domain name for the purpose of obtaining money from
the trademark holder, see generally John D. Mercer, Cybersquatting:Blackmail on the Information Superhighway, 6 B.U.J. Sci. & Tech. L. 11 (2000).
57. Shields, 257 F.3d at 488.
58. Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir.
2001).
59. Id. at 266-67. At this time, numerous other Web sites were available to Virtual
Works, including "virtualworks.net" and "virtualworks.org." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 267.
62. Id.
63. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 267.
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64
tual Works to relinquish the rights to vw.net to Volkswagen.
On appeal, the court considered the ACPA's nine factors in determining bad faith intent:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person,
if any, in the domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name
consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person; (III) the person's prior use, if
any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any
goods or services; (IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use
of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the person's
intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a
site that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without
having used the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or
services; (VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of the domain
name; (VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to
marks of others; and (IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in
the person's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and
65
famous.
The court stated that this list is not exhaustive, rather the most important grounds for finding bad faith are the unique circumstances of the
case. 6 6 Under this first inquiry in this case, there is both circumstantial
and direct evidence of bad faith. 6 7 Under the second ACPA inquiry, the
appellate court stated that there is no dispute that Virtual Works registered, trafficked in, and used vw.net. 68 There is also no dispute that the
VW mark is famous, and the district court was correct in holding that
vw.net is confusingly similar to VW's famous mark. 69 Thus the remedy
70
of ordering Virtual Works to relinquish vw.net was affirmed.
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney.71 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals ("PETA") sued
Doughney for several claims including the ACPA after Doughney registered the domain name "peta.org" and created a Web site called "People

64. Id.

65. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d) (1) (B) (2002).
66. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 268 (citing Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499).
67. Id. at 269.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 270-71.

70. Id. at 271.
71. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir.

2001).
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Eating Tasty Animals." 72 PETA owned the mark since 1992. Doughney
was quoted in the media as stating, "[ilf they want one of my domains,
they should make me an offer." Doughney does not deny this
73
statement.
On appeal Doughney argued that the ACPA claim was not pleaded,
but was only argued in the motion for summary judgment, that the
ACPA was improperly being applied retroactively, that he did not seek to
financially profit, and that he acted in good faith. 74 "None of Doughney's
arguments are availing," according to the appellate court.7 5 Thus the
76
district court was affirmed.
On August 23, 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated a district court's order dismissing claims under the ACPA on a
challenge raised three days before trial, with no excuse given for the delay in Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Porsche.net.77 In 1999,
Porsche companies filed a trademark dilution suit against 128 domain
names related to the Porsche trademark. Few of the domain names offered a defense, and default judgment was granted. 78 The ACPA then
passed, and the complaint was amended, adding anticybersquatting
charges. Three days prior to the scheduled trial date, British domain
names moved to dismiss, due to submitting to personal jurisdiction in
another district court. 79 The district court agreed with this assertion,
that if there is in personam jurisdiction, one can no longer proceed in
rem.80 The appellate court, however, concluded that the British domain
names objected too late to in rem jurisdiction based on subjecting their
82
registrant to personal jurisdiction.8 ' The case was remanded.
On the same day, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Harrods Limited v. Sixty Internet Domain Names extended the reach of the
72. Id. at 362. Doughney had fifty to sixty other domain names at the time of summary judgment. Id. The district denied a parody defense. People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000).
73. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 363. In addition,
Doughney also posted a statement at his Web site that PETA should negotiate a settlement
with him. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 367.
76. Id. at 371.
77. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).
78. Id. Porsche voluntarily dismissed its claims against others. Id. The district court
dismissed some claims against British domain names for lack of in rem jurisdiction under
28 USC § 1655 in Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va.
1999), vacated by Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Allporsche.com, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12843
(4th Cir. June 9, 2000).
79. Id. at 253.
80. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d at 249.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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ACPA by authorizing an in rem action not only against bad faith registration, but also against claims of trademark infringement and dilution.8 3 Harrods UK has the exclusive trademark rights to Harrods in
much of the world; Harrods BA has the right to Harrods in much of
South America. In the early 1990s, Harrods UK attempted to purchase
the rights from Harrods BA, and commenced litigation in British
courts.8 4 In 1999, Harrods UK launched a Web site under the domain
name "harrods.com;" Harrods BA began registering around 300 Harrods
related domain names. In 2000, Harrods UK sued in rem sixty of the
Harrods BA domain names in U.S. federal district court for trademark
infringement, dilution, and bad faith registration.8 5 The suit was in rem
since Harrods UK could not obtain personal jurisdiction over Harrods
BA. "It is not surprising that concurrent users of a shared mark would
resort to litigation under the recently enacted ACPA in an attempt to
gain through the courts what they failed to obtain by speedy registra86
tion," according to the Fourth Circuit.
The district court dismissed the trademark infringement and dilution claims, holding that in rem actions could only be maintained for bad
faith registration under the ACPA.8 7 The district court ordered that
fifty-seven of the domain names be transferred to Harrods UK, due to a
bad faith intent to profit, but the remaining six, basically, Argentina
names, belonged to the trademark holder, Harrods BA, which got summary judgment on these marks.8 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgment on the fifty-seven names.8 9 The appellate court, however, reversed the summary judgment on the six, and reversed the dismissal of
the infringement and dilution claims. 90 This is a landmark ruling extending the ACPA's in rem reach beyond bad faith registration to federal
infringement and dilution claiming. 9 1
In 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Bird v. Parsons
affirmed the judgment of the district court that the plaintiff failed to
state a claim against the defendants as no bad faith intent to profit was
83. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002).
84. Id. A British appellate court held that Harrods BA had an implied contractual
right to use the name Harrods in South America. Id. at 220.
85. Id. at 221.
86. Id.
87. Harrods,Ltd. v. Sixty Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (2001).
88. Id.
89. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 247-48.
90. Id.
91. According to the Fourth Circuit, this issue had not yet been settled by any circuit
court. Id. Another issue of first impression was the provider of proof, which was deemed to
be a preponderance of the evidence, as in other civil cases. Id.
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proven under the ACPA. 92 In 1985, plaintiff Bird started operating a
93
computer software business under the name Financia, Incorporated.
The next year he registered "Financia" with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 9 4 Bird registered "financia.com."9 5 Defendant Parsons registered "efinancia.com" at defendant Dotster, Incorporated, an accredited
registrar. 96 Bird "parked" the latter domain name at a Dotster Web site.
The day after Parsons registered "efinancia.com," defendant Afternic.com, a company that provides an auction service for domain
97
names, listed "efinancia.com" for sale.
Bird, pro se, filed suit for cybersquatting under the ACPA, as well as
trademark infringement, unfair competition and trademark dilution. 98
The district granted the Dotster defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and the Afternic and Dotster defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. 99 On appeal, the court held that the
district court did not err, and concerning the ACPA, held that the court
did not err in dismissing the ACPA claims against the Dotster defendants because Bird's complaint contained no factual allegations that supported the requisite bad faith intent to profit.1 0 0 The court of appeals
found a "more fundamental and indeed fatal flaw" in Bird's ACPA claim,
in that Bird must establish that the "defendants registered, trafficked in,
or used a domain name" under the ACPA. Only Parsons registered a
domain name, and there is no allegation that any of the other defendants
were Parsons' licensees. 10 1 Thus, the district court's ruling which
granted all defendants' motions to dismiss, except Parsons who did not
10 2
file such a motion, was affirmed.
In the most recent appellate court ruling at the time of this writing,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in InterstellarStarship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., on September 20, 2002 affirmed that there was
no cybersquatting as there was no bad faith intent to profit.103 The defendant Epix first used "Epix" in 1984 and registered it as a trademark
in 1990. Tchou, sole founder, officer, director, shareholder, and employee
92. Bird, 289 F.3d at 869.
93. Id. at 870.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Bird, 289 F.3d at 869.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 880. The court did conclude that the district court erred in granting the
Dotster defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, as Ohio's long arm
statute does reach these defendants. Id. at 876.
101. Id. at 880-81.
102. Bird, 289 F.3d at 882.
103. InterstellarStarship Serv. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
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of Interstellar Starship Services, registered "www.Epix.com," because
the name connoted electronic pictures.10 4 When Epix tried to register its
trademark as a domain name, it discovered it was already being used. 10 5
Epix requested that the registrar cancel the registration; the plaintiff
filed a suit for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.l0 6 Epix counterclaimed for unfair competition, trademark infringement under state
and federal law, and dilution. 10 7 The district court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiff.' 0 8 The appellate court reversed, holding that
there were contested issues of material fact. 10 9 On remand, Epix
amended its counterclaim to include a claim of cybersquatting under the
newly amended ACPA. 1 10 The district court found no cybersquatting
and no trademark dilution"' but the court did find past infringement, so
to remedy this, the district court enjoined future infringing use. 1 12 The
113
Epix appealed. 114
court did allow the plaintiff to keep Epix.com.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not require
the transfer of the domain name when the cybersquatting claim failed
for lack of proof of bad faith. 11 5 Calling cybersquatting "the Internet version of a land grab," 1 16 Epix did not establish before the district court
that there was an attempt to extort Epix. 1 17 While Epix wanted the domain name transferred without proving cybersquatting, the appellate
court stated that Epix provided no case wherein trademark infringement
required the forced transfer. 1 18 Thus, the appellate court did not order
it, and the district court was affirmed." 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act provides remedies
including the transfer of a domain name if there is a bad faith intent to
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id.
InterstellarStarship Serv. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or. 1997).
InterstellarStarship Serv. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999).
Interstellar Starship Serv. v. Epix, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1282 (D. Or. 2001).

111. Id.
112. Id. The plaintiff may no longer use the EPIX.COM logo without an appropriate
disclaimer of any affiliation with Epix. Id.

113. Id.
114. InterstellarStarship Services, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19632 at *29.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *26.
117. Id. at *29. A settlement offer by the plaintiffs attorney after the lawsuit commenced was made to settle the case, not to extort. Id.
118. Id. at *31.
119. Id. at *36.
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profit from that mark by a cybersquatter who registers, traffics in, or
uses a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive or famous mark. 120 Several U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions have
interpreted this 1999 Act. Several appellate courts, including the
First, 12 1 Second, 1 22 and Fourth 1 23 Circuit Courts of Appeals, have applied the ACPA retroactively, which is not ground breaking, as the ACPA
specifically states that it applies to all names registered before, after, or
124
at the time of its enactment.
The ACPA has been applied in the classic sense of cybersquatting,
when the domain name holder attempted to sell the name to the trademark holder, VW, in Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc. 125 When there was no bad faith intent to profit found, however, the
ACPA was not applied and the domain name was not transferred, even
though there had been prior trademark infringement, in Interstellar
Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc. 126 The ACPA has also been applied
when the bad faith intent to profit comes not from selling the domain
name back to the trademark holder, but from selling advertising seen by
27
those accidentally hitting the site, like in Shields v. Zuccarini.1
Perhaps two of the most interesting applications of the ACPA have
been by the First 128 and Fourth 12 9 Circuit Courts of Appeals. The First
Circuit in Sallen v. CorinthiansLicenciamentos LTDA held that U.S. federal courts do have jurisdiction when a domain name holder has lost a
dispute at the WIPO. 130 This ruling is important, as it reinforces the
ACPA and recognizes that U.S. standards may be different than WIPO
standards, and that U.S. federal courts may address the issue. The second major ruling came in August 2002, when the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit extended the ACPA's in rem jurisdiction beyond bad faith
intent to profit in registering domain names, to trademark infringement
13 1
and dilution suits.
The appellate courts have been consistent on such issues as retroactivity of the ACPA, but courts have differed on how far the reach of the
ACPA is to be expanded. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
August 2002 extended the in rem proceedings beyond bad faith intent to
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d).
Northern Light Technology, 236 F.3d at 66.
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d 489 at 502.
Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 268.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d).
283 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 947.
See generally Shields, 254 F.3d 476.
See generally Sallen, 273 F.3d 14.
See generally Harrods, 302 F.3d 214.
Sallen, 273 F.3d at 28.
See generally Harrods, 302 F.3d 214.
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profit, 13 2 while the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in September
2002, did not transfer a domain name under the ACPA without the finding of cybersquatting. 133 This may be setting the stage for an interpretation of the ACPA at the Supreme Court.

132. Id.
133. InterstellarStarship,304 F.3d at 948.
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APPENDIX A
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)
(2002), states:
(1) (A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this
section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that
person(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration
of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section
706 of title 18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United
States Code.
(B) (i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as,
but not limited to(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person,
if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name
of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in
a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain
or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona
fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
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(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or
the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such
domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at
the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the
meaning of subsection (c)(1) of section 43 [subsec. (c)(1) of this section].
(ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be
found in any case in which the court determines that the person believed
and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name
was a fair use or otherwise lawful.
(C) In any civil action involving the registration, trafficking, or use
of a domain name under this paragraph, a court may order the forfeiture
or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to
the owner of the mark.
(D) A person shall be liable for using a domain name under subparagraph (A) only if that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant's authorized licensee.
(E) As used in this paragraph, the term "traffics in" refers to transactions that include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans,
pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration.
(2) (A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a
domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered
or assigned the domain name is located if(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection
(a) or (c); and
(ii) the court finds that the owner(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who
would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would
have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed
under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain'name at the postal
and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and
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(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly
after filing the action.
(B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of
process.
(C) In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall
be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located; or
(ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding
the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court.
(D) (i) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall
be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain
name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. Upon
receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed
by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority shall(I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the
registration and use of the domain name to the court; and
(II) not transfer, Suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name
during the pendency of the action, except upon order of the court.
(ii) The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name
authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this
paragraph except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which
includes a willful failure to comply with any such court order.
(3) The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem
action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy available under
either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy
otherwise applicable.
(4) The in rem jurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be
in addition to any other jurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in
rem or in personam.

